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Abstract
An attempting investigation of the present situation of 
the town and village’s micro credit in the rural areas, 
by modeling the basic operational mode of the rural 
credit cooperatives and its cash flow process, as well 
as doing the analysis and assessment of risk and the 
corresponding problems, concluded that whether the rural 
credit cooperatives in rural areas of the most common 
microfinance mode is healthy or not, so as to predicted 
further the possible development and continue to pay 
attention to the latest development phenomenon.
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INTRODUCTION
Micro loan known as micro finance is the relevant agencies 
according to the farmers’ economic conditions and the 
credit degree loan to farmers in the approved amount and 
period. The loans are usually used for production, with 
the feature of small amount, short-term, no any guarantee 
flexible form of guarantee, low market interest rate’s level, 
and member’s organization. In rural areas, micro loan 
is in very important position in the allocation of funds, 
helping farmer households (hereinafter referred to as 
farmers) production and occupies. The rural microfinance 
operation has three basic models as follows: The first is 
the peasant joint guarantee loan. The establishment of 
5~10 households set up joint guarantee to do group loan, 
the households are guarantor for each other, if there is one 
household cannot timely repay the loan, the other members 
in the joint guarantee will have the liability for satisfaction. 
The 5 households in the next few years will be difficult to 
get a loan. These loans make full use of the supervision 
and restriction between farmers and reduce the loan risk, 
with its relatively large amount; the proportion of the 
loans amount in the total loans is generally higher. But 
the loans issued only to long-term fixed residence village. 
The second is credit loan system. It is controlled by the 
rural credit cooperatives, assisted by village committee 
members, select credit village in the township and village 
and the credit users in the shareholders. The users can 
obtain larger possibility of credit loans, higher amount. 
And as time passed, the credit index reflecting on the loan 
amount will increase. The third is personal mortgage loans. 
If farmers obtain the loans, they have to provide the real 
estate property and other certain mortgage or guarantee. 
The rate of such loans approved is relatively low, the loan 
amount is less accordingly.
1. THE CONSTRUCTION OF RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES CASH FLOW MODEL
In general, the rural credit cooperatives balance held on 
deposits is less than loan balance, rural credit cooperatives 
has no other source of funds, so the rural credit 
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cooperatives need to loan from the central bank; and the 
farmers will take new debt in old debt to maintain liquidity 
and turnover. So we believe that farmers will continue to 
get loan from the rural credit cooperatives. Based on the 
above analysis, we can get the following model:
If rural credit cooperatives deposits amount is S, the 
deposit interest rate is rs, then the refinancing amount 
is Lz, the refinancing interest rate is rz, According to the 
CBRC, rural credit cooperatives capital adequacy ratio 
should reach rc, the rural credit cooperatives equity capital 
(share capital etc.) should be (S+LZ)×
rc
1-rc. Therefore, 
the rural credit cooperatives available capital should be 
(S+LZ)/(1-rc). The CBRC also stipulates that rural credit 
cooperatives reserve ratio should be Re (Emergency 
fund’s deposit interest income rate in the central bank 
and its cost is basically the equal, so we will not consider 
effect of emergency funds in calculation of the profit). So 
the emergency amount is S×re, therefore, the rural credit 
cooperatives loans amount is [(S+LZ)/(1-rc)-S×re], but 
because the local micro loan demand is more than the 
rural credit cooperatives provided amount. And the rural 
credit cooperatives’ purpose is profit, so in most cases, 
rural credit cooperatives will loan to farmers with micro 
loan. For farmers, if we take all the farmers as an abstract 
subject: in the rural credit cooperatives the outstanding of 
deposit is S, the interest rate is rs, the loans he received is L, 
it will be L=(S+LZ)/(1-rc)-S×re, the loan interest rate is rL; 
farmers productive income is E.
Bank of China Rural credit cooperative Farmerloan loan again 
Figure 1 
Cash Flow Diagram Form
(1) Rural Credit Cooperative Cash Flow Model
Figure 2 
Rural Credit Cooperative Cash Flow Model
Point I: The rural credit cooperatives deposit is S, the 
cash is (S+LZ)×
rc
1-rc
.
Point II: The rural credit cooperatives deposit S and 
Bank of China refinancing LZ, cash is (S+LZ)/(1-rc).
Point III: The rural credit cooperatives loan to farmers, 
cash is S×re.
Point IV: The loan and interest the rural credit cooperatives 
recovered, the cash is (S+LZ)×(1+rc)+[(S+LZ)×(1+rc)-
S×re]×rL
Point V: Rural credit cooperatives pay back the 
refinancing and interest, at same time pay back the farmers’ 
deposit and interest. The cash is (S+LZ)×
rc
1-rc
+[(S+LZ)/
(1-rc)-S×r]×rL-S×rs-LZ×rZ
(2) The Farmer’s Cash Flow Model
Figure 3 
Farmer’s Cash Flow
Point I: Farmer’s surplus capital last production cycle 
is S.
Point II: Farmers will surplus capital S save in rural 
credit cooperatives, at same time got the rural credit 
cooperatives loan L.
Point III: Farmers got the production income E, the 
cash is L+E.
Point IV: farmers pay back rural credit cooperatives 
loan and interest, got the deposit and interest the rural 
credit cooperatives paid, the cash is E+S×(1+rs)-L×rL.
In order to discuss w the rural credit cooperatives 
and the microfinance model with farmers as main 
body is healthy, the normal rural credit cooperatives 
operate regularly, the operating conditions of rural credit 
cooperatives and farmers should be considered. 
(1) Rural Credit Cooperatives
  Cost: C=S×rs+LZ×rz ; (Formula 1)
Income: E=[(S+LZ)/(1-rc)-S×re]×rL (Formula 2)
So the rural credit cooperatives profit will be R=[(S+LZ)/
(1-rc)-S×re]×rL-S×rs-LZ×rz=S×[(
rc
1-rc
-re)×rL-rS]+LZ×[
rL
1-rC
-rz]
(Formula 3)
(2) Farmer
Cost:C' L×rL=[(S+LZ)/(1-rc)-S×re]×rL; (Formula 4)
Income:E'=S×rs+E.  (Formula 5)
So the farmer’s profit will beR'=S×rS+E-L×rL=E+S×[rS- 
( 11-rc
-re)×rL]-LZ×
rL
1-rc
 (Formula 6)
After calculation, we found that: the rural credit 
cooperatives and farmers’ profits both are from the 
farmers’ production operating income E. So that if 
farmers can regularly operate, have more or less income 
directly affects the regular operation of the rural credit 
cooperatives; In addition, if poor management will cause 
the bad and doubtful debts of rural credit cooperatives, 
which will bring considerable blow to rural credit 
cooperatives.
Therefore, when the farmer’s profit is less than 0, 
which means farmers are at loss, farmers can not repay 
the loans from rural credit cooperatives; So in the regular 
operation, the farmers’ profits must be more than or equal 
to 0. In fact, the fact is the farmers with new debt in old 
debt can not obtain big profits every year, which is to say 
farmers profit is equal to 0. So the ability of farmers to 
resist risk is very small. When farmers manage badly or 
encounter unexpected events (disease, natural disasters) 
they have no ability to repay the loan. The farmers’ 
profit is R'=S×rs+E-L×rL=0 (according to the Formula 
6), rural credit cooperatives’ profits is R=[(S+LZ)/(1-rc)-
S×re]×rL-S×rS-LZ×rZ=E-LZ×rZ (according to the Formula 
3). Therefore, the rural credit cooperatives’ profit is very 
small and all depends entirely on farmers’ production 
and operation.
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2.  THE INFLUENCE OF MACROECONOMIC 
VARIABLES FOR RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVES OPERATING RISK
From the above analysis we can see that if farmers 
operating condition is not good, the rural credit 
cooperative will not be able to stay in business, the mode 
of micro loan operation will collapse. Therefore, this 
operation mode as the only financial institutions with 
the rural credit cooperatives is fragile; anti risk ability 
is too small. The macroeconomic indicators change will 
influence farmers and the rural credit cooperatives cash 
flow and income, in the impact of the change of the macro 
economic indicators the rural credit cooperatives is likely 
to collapse.
2.1  Deposit’s Base Rate rs Alteration
Although the deposit base rate has been relatively 
stable, but taking into account of the economic situation, 
especially the problems of inflation, the potential risk 
of the deposit base rate for microfinance operation still 
can not be ignored. If the deposit benchmark deposit 
rate rs increases, it is obvious to impact on the rural 
credit cooperatives. From C=S×rS+LZ×rZ (Formula 1), 
R=S×[(
1
1-rC
-re)×rL-rS]+LZ×[
rL
1-rC
-rz] (Formula 3), we 
can see the rural credit cooperatives ‘s operating costs 
increase, the profit will further reduce; the original rural 
credit cooperatives profits is very small, in the small 
increase of deposit interest rate, it may cause the loss of 
rural credit cooperatives, or even bankrupt.
If the deposit benchmark deposit rate rS is reducing, on 
the surface it seems it will reduce the cost of peasant credit 
cooperatives, increase profits of rural credit cooperatives, 
there are certain benefits to the rural credit cooperatives 
operating; but in fact, on the other hand, the deposit 
benchmark rate is reducing, for the farmers that the profit in 
the whole production cycle is very small, almost 0 in terms, 
it is relatively large impact. R'=S×rS+E-L×rL (Formula 6), 
while the income of the farmers will be further reduced, it 
will cause the farmers’ loss and bankrupt.
2.2  Benchmark Loan Rate rL’s Alteration
ByR=[S(S+LZ)/(1-rC)-S×re]×rL-S×rS-LZ×rZ (Formula 3), 
if the benchmark loan rate decreases, the rural credit 
cooperatives’ interest income of loaning to farmers will 
decrease obviously, it will be devastating blow to the rural 
credit cooperatives. If the benchmark loan rate increases, 
from the R'=S×rS+E-L×rL (Formula 6), acting on the 
farmers, farmers’ production gains each year may not be 
able to pay the loan interest, so the farmers are likely to 
give up its microloan, resulting in the whole operation 
mode collapse in disorder.
2.3  Refinancing Rate rZ, Refinancing Total LZ’s 
Alteration
From C=S×rL+LZ×rZ (Formula 1) we can see, in the large 
loansLZ, and the increase of refinancing interest rates 
rZ will have great impact on the cost of the rural credit 
cooperatives, decrease a lot profit of the rural credit 
cooperatives. Although in the current national policy, the 
central bank should not raise loan rate; but considering 
the inflation rate continues to rise, we should pay more 
attention to the potential risk of re loan rates to the rural 
credit cooperatives. In fact, in the present situation, the 
refinancing interest rate is relatively less, that is [
rL
1-rC
- 
rZ]>0, it is positive correlation between the rural credit 
cooperatives profits and refinancing total ZL . From 
R=S×(
1
1-rC
-re)×rL-rS]+LZ×[
rL
1-rC
-rz] (Formula 3), if the 
central bank reduces the refinancing amount ZL , it will 
reduce the peasant cooperatives’ profits. Moreover, when 
the rural credit cooperatives can not meet the local loan 
demand of current situation, Refinancing amount reducing 
will bring difficulties to the rural credit cooperatives.
2.4  Capital Adequacy Ratio rC’s Alteration
Only from the rural credit cooperative profit formula 
R=[(S+LZ)/(4-rC)-s×re]×rL-S×rS-LZ×rZ (Formula 3), we 
can conclude that capital adequacy ratio rC increasing will 
lead to improve the profit of rural credit cooperatives. But 
in fact, rural credit cooperatives financing is difficult, the 
total equity capital is less. Therefore, the discussion of 
capital adequacy ratio should be considered as follows:
Rural Credit Cooperatives capital (i.e. equity capital) 
is constant (E), total assets will be E/rC; The deposit and 
relending will be S+LZ=
E
rC ×(1-rC)=E×(
1
rC -1). So the 
capital adequacy ratio increase will lead to the upper limit 
of the total decline in the rural credit cooperatives, thereby 
reduce the agricultural credit cooperatives loans amount, 
reduce the income of peasant cooperatives.
2.5  Reserve Rate re’s Alteration
From the rural credit cooperatives profit calculation 
fo rmula  R=[ (S+L Z) / (1 - r C) -S×r e]× r L-S×r S-L Z×r Z 
(Formula3), we can see clearly, if CBRC stated rural 
credit cooperative’s reserve ratio increase, it will reduce 
the rural credit cooperatives’ available total loan, reduce 
the income and profit of rural credit cooperatives.
Further discussion: because actually the total loans 
LZ obtained from the central bank is much more than 
total deposits of farmers S, (such as deposit ratio is up to 
400%-500% sometimes), so from the formula R=[(S+LZ)/
(1-rC)-S×re]×rL-S×rS-LZ×rZ , we concluded: influence 
of refinancing interest rate rZ’s change in rural credit 
cooperatives’ cost and profit is the much larger than the 
influence of the deposit. Benchmark interest rate change. 
Therefore the current inflation rate going up actually 
will bring great pressure to the central bank, then the 
refinancing interest rate is likely to rise, which will bring 
irresistible impulse to the rural credit cooperatives.
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In addition, the central bank intends to gradually 
reduce the total refinancing, which make the rural credit 
cooperatives on the road to provide for themselves. But in 
fact, rural credit cooperatives financing is difficulty, loan 
demand is a lot, loan and deposit ratio is very large. In 
view of the current situation, if the central bank reduces 
the loan amount, it will lead to sharp decline of the rural 
credit cooperatives loans amount and revenue, which will 
lead to the bankruptcy of the rural credit cooperatives.
As the required reserve base is S, total deposits or 
reserves =S×re, consider that the deposit S in the total 
assets ratio is smaller, so the change of the reserve ratio 
can make little effect to available total loans in the rural 
credit cooperatives. But the capital adequacy ratio rC 
is different, it requires the equity capital deposit and 
refinancing sum ratio (S+LZ) reaches rC/(1-rC). In fact, 
compared to large total deposits and loans, the rural credit 
cooperatives’ equity capital is not up to the standard, so 
farmers’ loan from buying shares in the actual operation, 
even so, rural credit cooperatives capital adequacy rate 
attained is still very difficult.
3.  THE INSTITUTIONAL RISK FACED BY 
RURAL MICROFINANCE
3.1  The Financial Risk
Because the rural credit cooperative can not achieve 
commercialization truly, and get independent, healthy 
and effective operation itself, its whole cash flow has a 
strongly dependent on the outside word so as to bring the 
great financial risk. Seen from the macro point of view, 
we analyze such risk as the following viewpoints. (a) If 
the benchmark interest rate rises, of course, the deposit 
interest rate goes up, too. On the one hand, it will increase 
the operational costs of the rural credit cooperative and 
affect the management. (b) If we keep other interest rates 
be unchanged and the benchmark interest rate of ordinary 
loan be rising generally, then the loan interest rate will 
increase exponentially. Because of the low anti-risk 
capability and the affordable limited scope of interest rate 
about the farmers, it is possible that the sharp fluctuations 
of the interest rate have a strong impact on loan demand 
so as to make the source of profit about the rural credit 
cooperative be reduced. On the other hand, it may increase 
the possibility of bad debts, because the farmers can not 
afford the interest. (c) In the situation of macro economy 
fluctuation, the lending rate will be improved on a certain 
pressure (such as inflation). Under the condition of the 
loan interest rate about the rural credit cooperative being 
unchanged, the huge operating costs may lead to nearly 
having no profits, even having a loss.
3.2  The Risk of Operating Model 
From the viewpoint of rural credit cooperative itself, there 
is still a considerable risk for this operating model. So far, 
the profitability indicators and loan indicators, which the 
credit union gives to the township and country rural credit 
cooperatives, have been increasing constantly. Considering 
its own interests, the workers of the subordinate rural 
credit cooperative may increase the amount of the loan 
in order to reach the total issued indicators. If this extent 
of borrowings exceeds the productivity gains which the 
local farmers can achieve, the new loans are likely to 
become bad debts. In addition, the loan-deposit ratio is 
basically higher than 200%. And the capital adequacy 
ratio is seriously low. If massive natural disasters occur, 
the farmers can not afford the payment. And the rural 
credit cooperative has no ability to go on run because of 
the hundreds and thousands of bed debts last year. These 
own risk still needs to rely on the support of the national 
capitals to avoid. Such a small village or town rural credit 
cooperative cannot be digested by itself.
3.3  The Payment Risk
Because of the singleness of the rural credit cooperative 
business object, on the one hand, the cash flow cycle 
is almost consistent with the production cycle of the 
farmers. After granting the credit in the period of spring 
plowing, reserve fund of the rural credit cooperative 
is usually seriously insufficient. And it often regains a 
normal state after it has recovered the loan at the end of 
the year. Sometimes, the rural credit cooperative should 
delay the payments when the farmers’ deposit needs to 
be cashed. Therefore, the credibility of the rural credit 
cooperative is not very high in the eyes of farmers so as 
to lead to many people who don’t need loans more willing 
to choose the state-owned commercial bank deposits. 
Such reputation and image in farmers’ heart can affect the 
source of the rural credit cooperative and the long-term 
development. On the other hand, owing to the limitation 
of the production about farming and animal husbandry, it 
has a strong dependency upon the natural conditions. The 
anti-risk capability for the rain-dependent farmer is very 
low. Then, a part of risk is transferred to the rural credit 
cooperative by means of petty loan. Moreover, because of 
the bad debts of many people, the natural disaster of an area 
may lead to the difficulty of the rural credit cooperative 
on-going operation.
3.4  The Credit Rating Risk
Although the rural credit cooperative has obtained a 
certain achievement by the small credit rating, it is still 
hard to get the true, fair and effective results by the system 
of credit rating. First of all, the annual income depends 
on how well the natural situation in this year gets because 
the local farmers are always rain-dependent. When the 
rural credit cooperative issues the loan, it can not estimate 
the annual income of the lender accurately. And as far as 
the local farmers are concerned there is nearly no assets 
used for mortgage. The rural credit cooperative can hardly 
establish a comparatively perfect information file in this 
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respect. The current evaluation method of the rural credit 
cooperative greatly depends on human factors, especially, 
the personal subjective judgment of the village cadres. It 
is difficult for the loan officers to know the situation of the 
villages truly, so the village cadres play a decisive role in 
the process of the user’s evaluation. Moreover, it is hard 
to avoid corrupt practices, such as bribery and so on, from 
which the village cadres reap the profits easily. And these 
loan farmers may can not repay the loan and interest to 
lead to the great increasing of the loan risk.
4 .   T H E  D I V E R S I F I C A T I O N 
COUNTERMEASURES OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVE
4.1  The Innovation of Operational Mechanism 
About the Rural Credit Cooperative
On the one hand, we can optimize the structure of reserve 
assets. The rural credit cooperative can determine the 
mutual ratio of the various assets. When we accelerate 
the velocity of loans and match up the length of 
maturity reasonably, it also can strengthen the property 
diversification; focus on efficiently using the stock, and 
compress non-performing loans. On the other hand, 
we make great efforts to grasp the credit information 
of the high quality customer, the research of product 
marketing and the industrial prospects survey by using 
scientific methods and means. And we should classify 
the prospective borrower scientifically in the context of 
increasing our own management benefit and customer 
affordability. In addition, we need to change the mode of 
operation and adjust the business strategy. In the process 
of adhering to the “agriculture, rural areas and farmers” 
service, the rural credit cooperative needs to combine 
with the actual and achieve the three transformations on 
operating management as soon as possible. Firstly we 
should pay attention the transformation from supporting 
quantitative mode to supporting scale efficiency. Secondly 
we should change the simple structure of assets and 
liabilities to diversification. Thirdly we should shift 
the decentralized funds and extensive management to 
centralized funds and intensive farming.
4.2  Establishing the Effective Risk Pre-warning 
Mechanism
Focusing on strengthening the risk management, 
preventing and controlling the credit risk at the core, we 
should build the comprehensive risk management pre-
warning mechanism accelerated, which includes the 
operating risk recognition and identification system, 
operational risk monitoring system, operational risk 
disposal system and so on, to scientifically and effectively 
strengthen the risk management. Such as the regular 
business analysis, risk assessment, regular physical count, 
all kinds of vouchers, account books, account checking, 
post-supervision of the business. Once it discovers that 
the risk reaches the warning line, it can send out the 
early warning timely, thus it brings the liquidity risk 
management into the orbit of science, normalization, 
programming, and gradually forms the liquidity risk 
management. Otherwise, we should build the emergency 
response plan of liquidity risk in order to start the plan 
timely for the possibly occurred liquidity risk, and try our 
best to control the risk in the smallest range.
4.3  Renovating the Rural Credit Environment 
and Strengthening the Loan Credit Guarantee
It is the responsibility of government to enhance the 
construction of the rural credit environment, cultivate the 
farmers credit consciousness, improve the farmers’ credit 
concept and change the farmers’ negative opinions for 
rural credit cooperative. On the one hand, we should make 
full use of the credit management of the new development 
of the people’s bank for reference, input the credit 
information of the farmers to credit reference system, 
introduce various rules and regulations, establish and 
improve the reward and punishment mechanism. On the 
other hand, in order to root the concept of repaying loans 
honestly in the heart of people deeply, we need to actively 
carry out the publicity and education of the policy, which 
requires the financial department, legal department, 
government departments to work together, and train the 
farmers’ credit consciousness step by step.
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